Collegial  nests  can Foster Critical Thinking, Innovative Ideas, and Scientific Progress. by Schwab, Andreas & Starbuck, William H.
Management Publications Management
5-2016
Collegial "nests" can Foster Critical Thinking,
Innovative Ideas, and Scientific Progress.
Andreas Schwab
Iowa State University, aschwab@iastate.edu
William H. Starbuck
University of Oregon
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/management_pubs
Part of the Business and Corporate Communications Commons, Management Sciences and
Quantitative Methods Commons, Performance Management Commons, and the Strategic
Management Policy Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
management_pubs/35. For information on how to cite this item, please visit
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Management Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Collegial "nests" can Foster Critical Thinking, Innovative Ideas, and
Scientific Progress.
Abstract
How can management and strategy scholars organize to generate more productive, more innovative, and more
impactful research? With appropriate cultures and leaders, small and egalitarian discussion groups that we call
“collegial nests” can become powerful generators of innovative ideas and creators of extraordinary scholars.
Collegial nests need cultures that free participants to think critically, to cherish new viewpoints, and to speak
freely without fear of ridicule. They also need leaders who model such cultures and facilitate frequent
discussions. Two case examples illustrate how productive collegial nests can create better science and better
scientists. To generate scientific innovation and progress on a large scale, many autonomous groups tackling
related issues are desirable. Modern communication technology is making it feasible for groups to operate
over large distances and to coordinate with each other at very low cost. Collegial nests offer greater potential
for enhancing scholarly productivity and innovation than do attempts to regulate scholarship via hierarchical
structures. Multiplicity can lower the probability of wasting resources on low-yield paths, egalitarian control
can reduce the influence of vested interests, and a combination of shared goals and partial autonomy can
integrate enthusiasm with sensible risk taking.
Keywords
research collaboration, group discussion, innovation, scientific progress, shared ideology
Disciplines
Business and Corporate Communications | Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods | Performance
Management | Strategic Management Policy
Comments
This article is from Strategic Organization, May 2016, 14(2); 167-177. DOI: 10.1177/1476127016643715.
Posted with permission.





COLLEGIAL “NESTS” CAN FOSTER  
CRITICAL THINKING, INNOVATIVE IDEAS, AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
 
 
Andreas Schwab  
Iowa State University 
3315 Gerdin Business Building 
Ames, IA 50011-1350 





William H. Starbuck 
Lundquist College of Business 
University of Oregon 
Eugene, OR 97403-1208 
Phone: (541) 343-6464 
starbuck@uoregon.edu 
 





Schwab, A. & Starbuck, W. H. (2016).  Collegial “Nests” Foster Critical Thinking, Innovative 







COLLEGIAL “NESTS” CAN FOSTER  




How can management and strategy scholars organize to generate more productive, more 
innovative, and more impactful research? With appropriate cultures and leaders, small and 
egalitarian discussion groups that we call “collegial nests” can become powerful generators of 
innovative ideas and creators of extraordinary scholars. Collegial nests need cultures that free 
participants to think critically, to cherish new viewpoints, and to speak freely without fear of 
ridicule. They also need leaders who model such cultures and facilitate frequent discussions. Two 
case examples illustrate how productive collegial nests can create better science and better 
scientists. To generate scientific innovation and progress on a large scale, many autonomous 
groups tackling related issues are desirable. Modern communication technology is making it 
feasible for groups to operate over large distances and to coordinate with each other at very low 
cost. Collegial nests offer greater potential for enhancing scholarly productivity and innovation 
than do attempts to regulate scholarship via hierarchical structures. Multiplicity can lower the 
probability of wasting resources on low-yield paths, egalitarian control can reduce the influence of 
vested interests, and a combination of shared goals and partial autonomy can integrate enthusiasm 
with sensible risk taking. 





Two economists who interacted freely, together and with others 
When Robert Solow joined the Department of Economics at MIT as an assistant professor 
in 1950, his office was across the hall from Paul Samuelson’s office. Samuelson was nine years 
older and already very well known; in 1947, he had been recognized as the living economist under 
age 40 "who has made the most distinguished contribution to the main body of economic thought 
and knowledge." Nevertheless, the two men became very close friends. Both kept their office doors 
open and they talked to each other every day about their research. Two years later, when their 
Department moved to a new building, they took side-by-side offices. Solow later observed, “. . . the 
location of that office and the fact that we liked each other so much had a major influence on the 
direction my career took. . . . Paul and I were close enough together so that either of us could holler 
and the other would hear. We would go back and forth all day long: 'I've got a problem.' So we'd 
talk about the problem" (Dizikes, 2011: 12).  
Samuelson and Solow remained close friends and collaborators through sixty years of very 
successful research. Both men received “Nobel” Prizes in Economic Sciences. They also extended 
their open-door collegiality to others around them, and colleagues and doctoral students consulted 
them freely. Subsequent winners of Nobel Prizes in Economic Sciences include five students 
whose dissertations they had supervised and a man whose office had been next door to those of 
Samuelson and Solow. 
There have been and are many collaborative research partnerships that inspire, support, and 
balance their members. Such partnerships emerge and dissolve in many places, and many of them 
have made or are making better science. Although partnerships can be very valuable for small 
numbers of researchers, they are unlikely to stimulate widespread changes in methodology, 
theorizing, or beliefs. The conditions that make partnerships effective do not scale-up easily. For 
example, Andreas and Bill can develop mutual trust over a period of several years involving the 
completion of several projects. Andreas can become confident that he can propose ideas without 
Bill’s laughing at them or stealing them. Bill can develop assurance that he can report his reactions 
to a draft manuscript without offending Andreas. 
Such personal trust, based in repeated interactions, is difficult to create across large groups 
with flexible memberships because it requires mutual norms that usually remain latent and 
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discussions that usually occur infrequently and in private. Yet people can build and maintain the 
needed trust in organic social arrangements, and such collegial nests can both generate radically 
innovative research and turn good researchers into outstanding researchers. Replicated in multiple 
sites and possibly linked by modern communication technologies, collegial nests have much 
greater potential to produce important research in management and strategy than do attempts to 
regulate scholarship from the top down. 
To make these ideas more concrete, this paper examines two cases of larger-scale research 
collaboration that give every appearance of having yielded extreme success. Drawing on the 
activities of researchers at Carnegie Institute of Technology during the 1950s, the next section 
explains why this type of collaboration is so often beneficial. The ensuing section then suggests 
that research collaboration needs to adapt to the technologies available in the 21st century, and 
proposes that intellectual discussion groups in Vienna a century ago might afford a model for the 
future. 
As we interpret them, both the Carnegie Institute and the Vienna cases exemplify medium-
sized social groups that we call “nests”. At least three properties make it possible for nests to 
encompass more people than partnerships do: Firstly, the participants share trusting cultures that 
enable them to expose themselves and their ideas to criticism or encouragement and that motivate 
the participants to keep moving forward toward new ways of thinking. Secondly, nests depend on 
leaders who establish and maintain these trusting, progressive cultures and who make sure that 
participants interact with each other. These nests have strong norms of equality to facilitate trust 
and open communication, so leaders avoid displaying hierarchical statuses (Zand, 1974). Thirdly, 
nests engage all participants in frequent social interactions, probably on a reliable schedule. These 
interactions are much more than conversations: They clearly have social and personal components, 
but at the same time, they focus strongly on the participants’ shared challenges, goals, and 
intellectual progress. The nest at Carnegie Tech aimed to create new approaches to research and 
teaching about business; the nests in Vienna fostered investigation of new ideas about physical and 
social science and scientific philosophy. 
Nests offer ways to organize shared intellectual activities that have produced good results 
and that researchers could implement on large scales. Creating such nests does not require much 
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explicit coordination or widespread agreements. The success or failure of one nest need not affect 
the activities of other nests. 
 
It is helpful to have companions when you walk an untrodden path 
Research activities make us aware of both the irreconcilable differences between 
individuals and collectivities and the importance of sharing and interacting. Sometimes individuals 
have unique insights that astound others; sometimes collaborators challenge each other or 
counteract missteps; sometimes teamwork is the only way to make progress. Social-science 
research raises such issues especially often because social realities depend so strongly on social 
construction within collectivities. For most social-science topics, researchers contribute by 
persuading other people that they have made correct “findings” so researchers need to anticipate 
the reactions of their probable audiences. 
One of the most important and useful functions of collective behavior is to expand the 
cognitive abilities of individual people. As individual thinkers, people have limitations that force 
them to simplify problems and situations. Unaided people can comprehend the relations between 
two variables easily and three variables with difficulty, but they find four or more variables to be 
too difficult. People also avoid nuances or deemphasize them, with a result being a strong tendency 
toward binary categorizing – black/white, true/false, good/bad, and so on (Faust, 1984; Meehl, 
1954; Starbuck, 2006). Although these simplifications appear to produce clarity, they can make 
problems less solvable and situations more confusing. People who exaggerate contrasts may be 
unable to see nuances. People who see only a few variables may be unable to understand situations 
that have many variables. M. C. Escher created two-dimensional images that seem to show three-
dimensional landscapes, but these landscapes cannot actually exist in three dimensions 
(http://www.mcescher.com/gallery/). Similarly, people who can think in terms of only two or three 
variables may erroneously believe they understand relationships among four or more variables even 
though these relationships do not actually exist, or these people may misinterpret actual 
relationships among four or more variables. Discussing complex situations with other people can 
show alternative interpretations and call attention to the influences of contingencies. 
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An example illustrates some consequences of human simplification. In a paper titled “The 
Proverbs of Administration,” Herbert Simon (1946: 53) criticized management experts for offering 
“proverbs that . . . almost always occur in mutually contradictory pairs.” He went on to cite a 
number of examples – sets of prescriptions that individually appear simple and practical, but also 
seem mutually contradictory. For example, Simon said that the generalization “Administrative 
efficiency is increased by a specialization of the task among the group” contradicts the 
generalization “Administrative efficiency is increased by limiting the span of control at any point in 
the hierarchy to a small number.” Summarizing, Simon explained (1946: 53): 
Most of the propositions that make up the body of administrative theory today share, 
unfortunately, this defect of proverbs. For almost every principle, one can find an equally 
plausible and acceptable contradictory principle. Although the two principles of the pair 
will lead to exactly opposite organizational recommendations, there is nothing in the theory 
to indicate which is the proper one to apply. 
In a footnote to the foregoing quote, Simon pointed out that similar issues arise in fields other than 
management. “'Lest it be thought that this deficiency is peculiar to the science – or ‘art’ – of 
administration, it should be pointed out that the same trouble is shared by most Freudian 
psychological theories, as well as by some sociological theories.” Indeed, similar issues arise in all 
forms of applied knowledge, including architecture, clinical psychology, engineering, law, 
medicine, and the writing of fiction and nonfiction. 
Strangely, Simon then proceeded to explain that people’s cognitive limits prevent them 
from having complete rationality. This segue is strange because it is precisely the human limits to 
rationality that make people offer and adopt contradictory prescriptions. Prescriptions are 
contradictory because each prescription has limited validity; it is useful under some conditions but 
not others. Simon was complaining that the prescriptions did not include the restrictions that would 
define their domains of applicability; he implied unfairly that the consultants and scholars who 
proposed prescriptions claimed that their prescriptions would have universal applicability. To spell 
out all of the conditions that define a prescription’s area of applicability is often difficult or 
impossible, and a prescription that would attempt to include such elaborate detail would be too 
complex for human brains to understand. 
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Simon later ventured into cognitive psychology, where he and Newell introduced the idea 
that human reasoning often makes use of heuristics – simple rules that shorten searches for 
information, focus attention on highly relevant information, and simplify choices. Newell and 
Simon (1956) understood clearly that heuristics overcome some capacity limitations of human 
brains, yet they did not extrapolate this understanding from artificially restricted contexts such as 
chess and mathematical logic to the challenges of formulating prescriptions about management in 
complex, changing environments. That is, the proverbs of administration were heuristics of various 
sorts (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). Although some “Proverbs of Administration” shortened 
searches for information, other Proverbs identified simple problem-solving strategies. Many 
Proverbs bear strong similarities to the hypotheses and propositions published in later management 
research papers. 
Simple propositions can serve as effective aids to thinking in large part because much 
thinking involves two or more people. Andreas says the shortest route is via Highway 58, and Bill 
replies by saying the fastest route is via Interstate 5. Thus, Andreas’ rule – estimate the shortest 
distance – has to compete with Bill’s rule – estimate the shortest time. Joan, sitting in the back seat, 
then asks where we can stop for lunch. Collective discourse can counteract human tendencies 
toward simplification. When individuals consider a single heuristic, collectivities are more likely to 
consider multiple alternative heuristics. When individuals see a few contingencies, collectivities 
usually see more contingencies. When individuals each espouse one or two goals, collectivities 
press for more diverse and contradictory goals. When individuals see dichotomous choices, 
collectivities see nuances and alternative solutions. Of course, people cannot or do not always 
augment the perceptions and logic of their collaborators, but several people are far more likely to 
see more issues or more potential solutions than one person does. 
Simon himself became a leader, member, and beneficiary of collective interaction in a 
research “nest” that revolutionized education and research in business and the social sciences 
(Simon, 1991; Starbuck, 2014). He was one of four senior professors who led the creation and 
operation of a nest in Carnegie Tech’s Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA). 
Leland Bach, Franco Modigliani, William Cooper, and Simon shared responsibility for assuring 
that all of the faculty and students gathered for coffee every weekday afternoon at 3:00. 
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Participation was not optional; the leaders toured faculty offices to make sure that all professors 
participated. The leaders also guided conversations toward the never-ending and pervasive theme: 
what new ideas would make business education and research more scientific? By modeling 
appropriate behavior, rather than by making pronouncements, these leaders created a revolutionary 
and inspirational culture that invited contributions from everyone. 
The coffee interactions lasted at least an hour, occasionally two hours. Participants normally 
broke into three or four conversation groups that amounted to small research seminars occurring 
simultaneously every afternoon. These egalitarian discussions, however, had no formal speakers. 
Indeed, doctoral students participated as actively as professors did. The school’s small size 
facilitated cohesion, and professors and students shared a sense of revolutionary pioneering that 
inspired them to think beyond existing conceptual frameworks. These discussions rarely dealt with 
completed work, people usually talked about projected work or work in progress. For example, one 
memorable afternoon, Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani (1958) sketched their ideas about the 
effects of financial markets on investors’ evaluation of firms’ financial reports; their audience was 
a group of about five people. At that time, MBA finance courses were teaching that stock prices 
depended on the percentage of debt that firms carried. Miller and Modigliani argued that, in perfect 
capital markets, it does not matter what capital structure a company uses to finance its operations. 
The informal group discussion probed for holes in their argument and contested the plausibility of 
perfect markets for capital. When published, this paper revolutionized financial theory, and some 
years later, its authors received Nobel Prizes in Economic Sciences for having placed a theoretical 
foundation under the field of corporate finance. 
Sometimes, there were also formal seminars in a classroom. These featured presentations by 
potential employees or invited speakers, and they resembled research seminars at most universities. 
However, the outside speakers often became irrelevant when these seminars turned into debates in 
which Modigliani argued that the presented research showed the rationality of human behavior and 
Simon argued that the presented research demonstrated humans’ cognitive limitations. 
The social system at GSIA illustrates how frequent social interaction and the right kind of 
cultural support can create successful radical innovators out of professors and students who might 
have been conventionally successful in other environments. Emotional support from colleagues 
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helps innovators to persist in their efforts, and social interaction encourages people to venture into 
ideas that are more radical. Familiar colleagues can challenge proposals in supportive tones that 
make new ideas more complete and strengthen them for external exposure. The professors and 
doctoral students pioneered in artificial intelligence, computer programming languages, 
forecasting, laboratory experiments about group decision making, mathematical techniques of 
several kinds, organization theory, production planning, robust regression, and computer simulation 
of human thought, business decisions, and long-term competition between firms. The Carnegie 
Foundation and the Ford Foundation both produced studies of business education that pointed to 
GSIA as a prototype of a better school (Gordon and Howell, 1959; Pierson, 1959). 
At GSIA, the participants grew from about five professors in 1952 to 15 in1960, and the 
school awarded 15 doctorates to students who were there before 1960. These professors and 
doctoral students received many honors. Four of them received Nobel Prizes in Economic Sciences 
and several others received repeated nominations for these Nobel Prizes. These 30 professors and 
students also received the highest career awards possible in accounting, artificial intelligence, 
computer science, management, management science, psychology, and sociology. One doctoral 
student founded a successful market-research firm, and the other doctoral students all received job 
offers from prestigious business schools or economics departments. 
 
Multiple expeditionary patrols are better than an army for opening up a large and diverse 
territory 
Management thinkers carry a burden of past studies that focused on large industrial 
companies and their rational hierarchical structures. Such organizations may have suited the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but rational hierarchies have been growing obsolete for 
many decades. As workers have gained education, they have become less and less tolerant of 
hierarchies and supervisors (Laudon and Starbuck, 2001). Electronic communication has made it 
practical to organize virtually (Baumard and Starbuck, 2001). Peter Senge caught the spirit of 
workers in the late 20th century in a best-selling book about The Learning Organization (Calhoun, 
Starbuck, and Abrahamson, 2011). Senge defined (1990: 10) The Learning Organizations as: 
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... organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they 
truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective 
aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together. 
In 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, a group of 
organization theorists invited an expert on terrorism, Bowyer Bell, to tell them about terrorist 
organizations. Bell astounded his academic audience when he estimated that 100,000 to 200,000 
Muslims were so unhappy, so dissatisfied, that they were poised at the brink of overt violent action. 
The 1000 or so visible terrorists, he said, were merely one manifestation of a new kind of 
organization that was integrated by shared beliefs and motives rather than by hierarchical 
management structures. Such integration meant that potential terrorists could erupt almost 
randomly as conditions shift. Bell predicted that the capture or death of Osama bin-Laden would 
have no long-term effect on the activities by this new kind of organization. Indeed, the complete 
elimination of al-Qaeda would likely have no long-term effect on this new kind of organization 
because al-Qaeda influenced only a tiny fraction of the many people who had potential to act. He 
speculated that Muslim discontent would remain a serious threat for decades to come. 
Bell (2002) labeled this new kind of collaborative entity a “force-field organization” of 
shared beliefs and motives – ideologies. Such force-field organizations integrate potential actors, 
who have the possibility to actualize. Who acts and which actions they take can be quite random 
and accidental because they are specific instances from very large pools of latent possibilities. The 
emergent acts may take different forms and pursue different missions in different ways at different 
times. Since ideas can travel over very large distances at high speeds, a force-field organization 
places little or no importance on control structures or formal rules. Indeed, general rules and 
structures are mostly ineffective and not needed because members tend to collaborate in 
independent, emergent, self-guided groups. Autonomy, multiplicity, opportunism, and spontaneity 
are strategic strengths, but across individual members and groups, shared ideology mitigates 
tendencies toward chaotic entropy. Although force-field organizations may waste some resources 
through unfocused activity, they also gather resources through entrepreneurial enterprise. Force-
field organizations have generated societal revolts and financed innovative new companies, and 
they have diverse potential applications in a globalizing world where much low-cost, high-speed 
communication occurs between people who have never met face-to-face.  
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Precursors of force-field organizations include virtual organizations, a concept that emerged 
in the mid 1990s as more and more people gained access to the Internet and employers began to 
assign tasks to employees who worked at their homes. Handy (1995) wrote about the importance of 
mutual trust between employers and employees in virtual organizations, and Cohen and Mankin 
(1999) argued that collaboration becomes especially important within virtual organizations. 
Markus, Manville, and Agres (2000) proposed that managers should treat off-site employees like 
unpaid volunteers who are working because they believe in the organization’s goals; they reported 
that off-site employees often expect to have voice in their organizations’ governance.  
The notion of force-field organizations takes account of the next step in organizational 
evolution, organizational members who participate primarily because of their commitments to their 
organizations’ goals. Wages and formal organizational memberships lose relevance. In research 
communities, force-field organizations can create feelings of social support that can reinforce 
commitments to existing theories and logics or that can support widespread willingness to explore 
new ideas and innovative logics. History indicates that both types of ideologies usually coexist, 
with fluctuating numbers of participants (Kuhn, 1962; Toulmin, 1972).  
Research can, and probably should, be conducted by force-field organizations because more 
hierarchical and systematic research organizations depend heavily on their abilities to predict which 
projects might turn out to be productive or unproductive (Committee on the Science of Team 
Science, 2015). For collective research to add up to scientific progress, forecasts about individual 
projects must be not entirely wrong, and research about effective forecasting offers a relevant 
lesson (Graefe et al., 2014; Pant and Starbuck, 1990). The average of two or more credible 
forecasts is nearly always more accurate than any one of the component forecasts. Each credible 
forecast expresses some people’s ideas and observations about the unfolding events that are 
creating the future, so it is usually useful to make allowance for these ideas and observations. This 
implies that it is not useful to organize all researchers into a single comprehensive structure 
because this allocation of activities places too much reliance on creating a single overall forecast 
about the most productive paths into the future. Indeed, for research that explores vaguely seen 
possibilities, it is not sensible to integrate multiple forecasts because research activities construct 
unforeseen trajectories into the future. To reveal the potentialities in each forecast, researchers need 
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to treat it as a clearly different option. Thus, an allocation that encourages different researchers to 
create the futures they imagine is likely to be most effective (Sarasvathy, 2001). A certain level of 
chaos and accidents spurs discovery, and confusion and ambiguity are useful as ways to counteract 
over-simplification (Weick, 2016). 
Beyond their low reliance on forecasting, force-field organizations both diversify risks and 
motivate members. Members or groups can work on research projects they consider very 
important, adopt research methods that suit local contingencies, and take advantage of emerging 
opportunities. This flexibility raises the probabilities that each project will yield useful results, 
while lowering the probability that all projects will fail due to their similar weaknesses. 
Intellectual discussion groups in Vienna may exemplify the functioning of a research-
oriented force-field organization composed of many autonomous groups. Between the 1860s and 
the mid-1930s, Viennese intellectuals participated in various “study-circles” (also called “Kreise” 
or “Privatseminare”). The study-circles expressed a widespread interest in new ideas and 
possibilities for theoretical or practical development (Hayek, 1983). The overall guiding ideology 
was hope that new ideas can have value, a hope that elicited curiosity and enthusiasm, as well as 
confidence that group discussions are an effective way to explore ideas. Some study-circles focused 
on specific fields, but many scholars had wide-ranging interests, so some circles explored diverse 
topics, and some participants attended more than one circle. Although study-circles were 
autonomous, contagion produced subthemes that appeared in many groups; these included the 
dependence of reality on perceptions and the dependence of contemporary behaviors on 
developmental history. 
A few study-circles were organized by professors and were probably intended for work 
colleagues and doctoral students. Most study-circles had no formal relations with a university, 
although many participants studied or taught in universities. People participated as an avocation, 
for the pleasure of intellectual discussion and learning. Some participants worked in businesses or 
government agencies, and the study-circles met in scholars’ homes, government agencies, or 
business offices. Some circles started in offices in the early evening and moved to cafes later that 
night. Groups of about a dozen people met every week or two from October to June, usually in the 
evening from 6 or 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. or 12 a.m. Well-known scholars organized the circles, but 
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these organizers did not use them as venues for teaching and they charged no fees and received no 
additional income from the circles. Indeed, organizers often provided coffee and cookies or 
sandwiches. 
For example, in 1921, Friedrich von Hayek and Herbert Furth organized the Geistkreis 
(Mind Circle), which continued meeting once or twice a month until 1938. The Mind Circle had 25 
participants over its 16 years. The regular participants included a mathematician, a natural scientist, 
a philosopher, a political scientist, a sociologist, two art historians, and five economists, and they 
presented papers to each other about all of the foregoing subjects as well as history, literature, and 
neuroscience. Contemporaneous with the Mind Circle, there were at least two other study-circles 
that devoted much attention to economics: one, organized by Ludwig von Mises, met in his office 
at the Chamber of Commerce, and the other, organized by Hans Meyer met at the University. 
Study-circles also existed in other countries. At the University of Heidelberg during the 
latter decades of the 1800s, Karl Knies organized a study-circle that served as a forum for theory 
development and critique in the social sciences. Participants in Knies’ circle included men who 
later became influential economists in Vienna, London and the United States. A group that called 
themselves the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy had close relations with a Viennese study-
circle organized by Moritz Schlick from 1924 to 1936. Participants in the Schlick Circle later had 
profound influence on philosophy in Britain and the United States. In 1902, Alfred Einstein, 
Conrad Habicht, and Maurice Solovine formed a group that they called Akademie Olympia. In 
addition to its three core members, five others participated occasionally. They usually met in 
Einstein’s apartment in Bern, where they discussed books about philosophy by writers such as 
Mach, Mill, Plato, and Poincaré, but also nonfiction books on other topics and works of fiction 
(e.g., Cervantes, Dickens). 
Nevertheless, Vienna appears to have had a special culture that bred many study-circles on 
many topics. Collegial nests bonded by an intellectually focused force-field organization had 
powerful synergistic impacts. Indeed, it is impossible to overstate the influence of these Viennese 
study-circles on western thought during the twentieth century. The Viennese circles visibly 
changed economics, mathematics, physics, psychoanalysis, scientific philosophy, social 
psychology, and sociology. In particular, participants in various Viennese circles originated or 
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influenced the evolutionary, industrial, and resource-based views in contemporary strategic 
management (Powell, Rahman, and Starbuck, 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
At GSIA, a small group of senior professors set out to revolutionize business education by 
introducing more-scientific research methods and more-rational decision-making techniques. They 
wanted to try out specific ideas such as computer programs, laboratory experiments, mathematical 
models, and statistical analyses, and they tried to involve many more professors and doctoral 
students in this effort. One of their primary ways of enlisting others was to create daily coffee-hour 
discussions. The leaders insisted that everyone join these discussions at least briefly, and they 
steered the conversations toward topics directly related to the desired innovations. The leaders also 
modeled egalitarian norms that respected everyone’s ideas and opinions. Different discussion 
groups formed spontaneously with different members each afternoon. Thus, the professors and 
doctoral students developed a shared culture that advocated innovation and supported the 
innovative efforts of individuals and partnerships. 
In Vienna, although professors organized a few study circles for academic colleagues and 
doctoral students, intellectual leaders organized most of the study circles for the pleasure of their 
friends. The study circles had fairly stable core memberships over several years, although some 
members did drift in and out. An intellectual climate motivated the educated people from diverse 
occupations to participate because they enjoyed discussing new ideas, philosophical issues, or 
interesting books. The study-circles developed autonomously but they existed in an overarching 
ideology that embraced intellectual exploration and discovery, and contagion across group-created 
subthemes. The leaders did not teach; various participants took responsibility for introducing or 
summarizing topics; everyone joined into the discussions. Thus, the study circles eventually 
fostered creation of conceptual frameworks, theories, and philosophies that affected many 
academic fields. 
Neither GSIA nor Vienna generated dramatic innovations because they just happened to 
assemble exceptionally creative geniuses. Both locations had many brilliant, imaginative people. 
However, there were many brilliant, imaginative people in other universities and cities. Neither 
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GSIA nor Vienna was generally regarded as having exceptional intellectual resources until the 
innovations began to occur, and indeed, one could make a strong case that other locations had 
people of greater individual ability. The study-circles changed their participants – their ways of 
thinking and their careers and probably their abilities. Stimulated by the general enthusiasm for 
intellectual discussions and inspired by the interactions with other people who were enthusiastic 
about exploring new ideas, excellent people learned and taught each other and became very 
exceptional. Similarly, at GSIA, the group interactions changed the thoughts, careers, and abilities 
of the people who participated in them. The afternoon coffee discussions challenged professors and 
doctoral students to search constantly for opportunities to make business research more scientific, 
and again excellent people learned and taught each other and became very exceptional. Both 
situations demonstrate the power of frequent social interactions, when guided by the right cultural 
values and leaders, to make people more creative, more insightful, more profound thinkers. In these 
egalitarian groups, participants received emotional support to risk new thoughts as well as gentle 
testing of these thoughts by other people with supportive intentions. 
It is significant that both situations broke into small groups for discussions. The Viennese 
study-circles were usually about a dozen people, but Einstein’s Akademie Olympia in Bern 
numbered only three to five. GSIA’s coffee sessions broke into groups of about five. Small groups 
gave everyone opportunities to speak and put pressure on individual members to contribute 
usefully. For small groups to have wider influence, the groups and their members have to promote 
their ideas effectively beyond the groups’ boundaries. Vienna stood out as an intellectual center 
because the Viennese formed many loosely interconnected study-circles that discussed many topics 
in many fields. Geographic proximity and participation in multiple groups facilitated diffusion of 
ideas across study-circles; scholars moved to other cities and countries; scholars published books 
and articles. 
The twenty-first century offers scholars new opportunities to create situations that resemble 
GSIA or Vienna’s circles and to link them on a much larger scale through force-field organizations. 
In principle, scholars today can form many, many nests, including ones that span large distances. 
The challenge is to develop open communication and to sustain it long enough to create mutual 
trust. Very likely, productive nests will have to be rather small and have stable core memberships 
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like Einstein’s Akademie Olympia. Larger groups with fluid subgroups, like GSIA, may be difficult 
to sustain because fruitful collaboration raises complex issues for the development of interpersonal 
trust and the communication of tacit knowledge. However, users of social media are developing 
norms about whom to trust that place less reliance on face-to-face contact (Panahi, Watson and 
Partridge, 2016). Zhang (2013) found that after an introduction by a trusted mutual contact, pairs of 
researchers developed interpersonal trust despite having no face-to-face contact. As well, future 
communication technology may provide richer experiences and better ways to enhance personal 
closeness. Hence, academia has only started to adjust and exploit the rising opportunities. 
Scholars of strategic organization (and other academic fields) should be creating collegial 
nests that function within supportive force-field organizations. Such an approach offers greater 
potentials for scholarly productivity and innovation than do attempts to regulate scholarship 
hierarchically on the specious assumption that many researchers should be trudging along in 
furrows chosen by scholarly prophets who possess much superior foresight about the discoveries 
that future research will yield. 
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